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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to lead an overview on Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order 
to highlight the frozen state of affairs through an alternative prospective left currently out within the 
peacekeeping operations. Therefore, main attention is not paid to OSCE-Minks attempts to unfreeze the 
ethnic conflict, however to the role of collective trauma and historical imaginary to point out the Other 
question that will be performing a structural role when the two-decades-war will be hopefully over. Hence, 
what is to be forgotten from wrenching past? How will the figure of the Other – no matter Armenian or 
Azerbaijani – affect the post-conflict scenario currently negated by cultural prejudices and political 
propaganda?    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The worsening conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is the oldest war in the former Soviet 
orbit and the Europe’s longest continuous military confrontation between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. In the current insecurity and uncertainty scenario over the two-decades-
conflict, it is surprising that neither side are ready to compromise due to a lack of social 
restoration and peace agreement they should establish. However, the two Caucasian young 
republics’ real grievances and legitimate claims under international law have generated a 
“war of law-s” by which both states have been over years clinging to their “all-or-nothing” 
outlooks. Although Minsk Group’s mediation pays regular visits in the field, several 
attempts to reach a peace resolution in long-term perspective have failed due to a lack of 
political motivations and wills in order to definitely compromise (Ayunts, Zolyan, and 
Zakaryan 2016).  
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The European Union initiatives of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), too, in which 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are post-Soviet Member States, seem to be unless in their concrete 
application. This paper will be threefold.  
Firstly, I will try to briefly unravel the historical background over territorial conflict 
in order to lead a general overview regarding the most important events and to step forward 
to the second key-area. Here, I will privilege more categories of culture and social 
dimensions to describe the cluster of emotions, prejudices and perceptual distortions 
manipulatively driven by historical imaginary and collective trauma in turn controlled by 
ruling élites. By doing so - according to many intellectuals, cultural historians and political 
experts - I will argue that political discourses, ideology and historical narrative ought to be 
privileged categories of social analysis (Curtis 1997, 3) in order to supplant the older view 
that human societies have to be studied as a realm of competing structures, contending 
classes and groups. Few statistical analyses will be provided in order to introduce the third 
part about the “Other question”, which would be fit best for the purpose of the paper. 
Besides open sources I below mention in the paper, interviews were conducted during my 
personal visit in the de facto Minister of Intern and in the rural villages of Hadrut and 
Shoushi with locals, of whom the majority is currently performing at the Armenian Armed 
Forces alongside the Line of Contact (LoC). All participants were promised anonymity, a 
necessary precaution in the present political climate and situation of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.          
Therefore, through a dismantlement of the idea of national purity and the myth of 
exclusive belongingness, I will introduce the structural role of the Other that - no matter 
Armenian or Azerbaijani - will come to perform in the future post-conflict scenario despite 
the current negation from both sides.  In conclusion, by insisting on the significance role of 
historical location and process of internally displacement, one point must be clear. Granted 
territorial ruptures over Nagorno-Karabakh explore deeply the remarking of Armenian and 
Azerbaijani identity, this paper aims to introduce a challenging prospective within the 
current peacekeeping operations by paving a sustainable way - at least theoretically - 
towards a future of well-living together. However, I deal with an approach based on the 
philosophical boundary between Self and the Other (Glavanakova 2016, 46) that could be 
misleading with regard to this two-decades-conflict between two states, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, tied partially to other two states, namely Russia and Turkey.       
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Since 1923, in spite the majoritarian community was Armenian before the 
Sovietisation of the Southern Caucasus, the Nagorno-Karabakh was administratively 
assigned to the Turkic-Islamic Soviet republic. Because of that, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) remained ethnically and culturally a hybrid and without a 
self-identification as well as recognition in terms of historical legacy and cultural heritage. 
It followed that a psychological model and epistemological configuration of the subjects 
living the enclave were considerably simplified (Tlostanova2005, 194) similarly to the 
entire Soviet orbit. Therefore, Armenian and Azerbaijani locals were forced to lean towards 
a rigid ethno-cultural model of “one Soviet people” (Kundera 1984, 1), heavily russified 
and without possibility to find their self-realization according to their religions or socio-
cultural patterns. Due to this overwhelming Communist reduction, attempts to unravel the 
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enclave resettlement after the collapse of the Soviet system turned negatively enough from 
a considered look (Griffin 2001, 1) to ethnic uprising over mountainous region. With the 
collapse of Soviet system, as ideology as political regime, and the euphoria for the fall of 
Berlin Wall, the ethnic turmoil of Nagorno-Karabakh began to impinge the state-buildings 
of the formerly Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR from within.   
During the Soviet era, specifically with the Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid 
Brezhnev times, in Armenia there were constant attempts by students and youths to find 
alternative organizations to the Communist Party. In the meantime, demands and 
campaigns for recognition of the Ottoman genocide and the reclamation of the lost lands 
were at the heart of the political activity. In 1966, for sample, the National Unification 
Party called for an Armenia as independent state, which would include the Karabakh 
enclave, the Azerbaijani exclave of Nachichevan, and the Turkish controlled Western 
Armenia (Goldenberg 1994), namely the former Armenian millets of the Ottoman Empire 
in Anatolia. All those demands have been always ignored by Kremlin.  
When on the 20th February 1988 the Local Council of the People’s Duties of 
Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) decided to secede from Azerbaijan SSR, 
it was not expected that the conflict between the Caucasian young republics would take 
place for so long time. Overcoming the non-Armenian resistance of Azerbaijani duties and 
chairperson, who were loyal to the central Azerbaijani SSR government in Baku, the 
Armenian declaration led clashes and broad tensions among Armenian civilians within the 
territory of Azerbaijan SSR (Savin 2015, 106-107) and, in turn, among Azerbaijani 
inhabitants within the collapsing Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Since then, a 
point of no-return began to negatively shape as Armenian as Azerbaijani refusals to looking 
for a peaceful solution; their inability to forget and the impossibility to grasp the horror and 
liberation (Glavanakova 2016, 175) became collective traumas.  
Throughout the sub-regional uprising, Armenia decided to bind itself to Russia, 
allowing military bases to remain as open displays of muted Russian influence in light of 
the Christian Orthodox alignment. On the other side, Azerbaijan took an even more risky 
path (Griffin 2001, 183) due to its bickering politicians who without Russian military aids 
tried to achieve benefits from the powerful economic position flirting with Turkey, United 
States, France, and Britain. Hence, the territorial turmoil affected deeply Azerbaijan on one 
side, a post-Soviet Turkic country rooted in its Persian cultural heritage and Transcaucasian 
powerhouse of global energy supplies thanks to the oil flowing in abundance from its 
shores, and Armenia on the other side, the first ever nation-state to adopt Christianity as its 
state religion. Although the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh was heavily showing how ethnic 
issues started to be politicised and how cultural differences interplayed a fundamental role 
in the process of constructing societal identity and ugliness of ethnic cleansing, the wider 
scenario cannot be taken into the arguable account of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. 
According to the Bulgarian expert Alexandra Glavanakova, indeed, Huntington’s 
classification dismisses itself out from a more largely and arbitrary criteria and, specifically 
to Nagorno-Karabakh outbreak, the latter seems to be not aligned to his list alike a wide 
range of worldwide ethnic riot. Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry was not triggered neither by 
religious schism in the Transcaucasian region in order to reallot the former Autonomous 
Oblast back to the Christian Armenia or to the Muslim kinship of Azerbaijan. However, the 
stress shifts on the subjective identification of individuals with their own community, in 
which ethnic issues address ontologically and respectively the idea of “ethnicity” (Krasteva 
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2015, 4) in terms of a given group with objective, existence and subjective sense of 
belongingness. For example, the former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, has 
rejected the idea of any religious motivation from the beginning.  
Moreover, the Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry has specifically created from the 
beginning a mutual separation of a non-ethnic “Us” and ethnic Others (Smith 1996, 4) 
based on proper name; myth of common ancestry including the idea of common origin, 
which gives to the group a sense of kinship; shared memories of common past; heroes and 
events; elements of common cultures, like language, religion or customs; a link with a 
homeland; and, a sense of collective solidarity. In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, both 
communities depict their nations as “a great family” where brothers and sisters of the 
motherland or fatherland evoke strong loyalties and vivid attachments. Besides, hundreds 
of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis have lost their homes in a forced population 
transfer
1
 and have been living for generations outside their own republics. In details, the 
first military actions of the conflict - according to the official data from the government of 
Azerbaijan - led to Azerbaijan 30.000 were injured, 7000 being disabled for life and 5000 
citizens are reported as missing. Throughout the same period of war, the Armenian side lost 
6000 citizens, 20000 people were injured and more than 5000 Armenians have gone 
missing (Kirvelyté, 2015).  
In early April 2016, the so-called “Four-Day War” alongside the Lines of Contact 
(LoC) reminded the international community that this long-ignored “frozen conflict” has 
begun to heat drastically up without finding out a stable resolution yet. More than hundred 
causalities on both sides, 150 wounded among civilians and military staff, and 
approximately 15 thanks destroyed with a wide range of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 
is the result of the last peak of military escalation erupted on 2nd and ceased on 6th 
(Lorusso 2016, 1) after the umpteenth ceasefire agreement.  Until now, over 20% of de jure 
recognized territory of Azerbaijan still remains under the control of de facto Republic of 
Artsakh - Nagorno-Karabakh (Kirvelyté 2015, 24-25), including neighbouring Azerbaijani 
districts too. As the table indicates below, in spite it does not provide the entire scenario 
after the early April 2016 escalation, after which Azerbaijani troops have been retaken the 
control over 900 mq
2
 of Martakert region. Armenian armed forces have occupied several de 
jure Azerbaijan regions surrounding the entire Nagorno-Karabakh in order to buffer a 
sanitary zone in protection of Karabakh Armenians.   
 
Table 1: Nagorno-Karabakh Buffer Zone Occupied by Armenian Armed Forces (Source: The Margins 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: In Search of Solution, 2015) 
 
 %  of de facto territorial control by 
Armenian armed forces 
De Jure Azerbaijani lost territory 
in Nagorno-Karabakh 
Kelbajar-Karvacher 100% 1.936 km 
Lachin-Abdollyar 100% 1.835 km 
Kubatli-Vorotan 100% 802 km 
Jebrail-Jrakan 100% 1.050 km 
Zangelan-Kovsakan 100% 707 km 
Agdam-Akna 77% 842 km 
Varanda-Fuzûlî 33% 462 km 
                                                          
1This phenomenon, well-known as “Internally Displaced Person-s” (IDP-s), has increased the academic literature 
concerning studies about migrations and conflict scenarios. 
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BEYOND THE CONFLICT:  
COLLECTIVE IMAGINARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMAS 
 
Despite political attempts and OSCE-Minsk peacekeeping actions to unfreeze the 
territorial rivalry alongside the Line of Contacts (LoC), it seems no longer possible to solve 
the current situation within the framework of existing intergovernmental relations.  The 
Republic of Azerbaijan declares its territorial integrity unshakeable and the full liberation 
of lost territories occupied by Armenians as main prerequisite condition for any substantial 
negotiations with Armenia, considered guilty to support an illegal occupation. Moreover, 
Baku claims to plenty resettle Qarabağ to de jure territory according to the Soviet-Russian 
recognition that tied the enclave to Azerbaijan SSR in light to the Mongol, Turkish, and 
Persian legacy that the region has had even before the sovietization in 1923. On the 
contrary, de facto Republic of Artsakh - Nagorno-Karabakh continues to declare that the 
secession from the former Azerbaijan SSR administration, understood as the “liberation of 
Karabakh”, is the legitimate result ex factis jus oritur (Krüger 2010, 89), namely a law 
arises from the facts. In addition, the Republic of Armenia has stubbornly pointed out that 
the struggle for independence and recognition brought all Armenians into a safety position 
(Savin 2015, 112) and guaranteed justice and protection against the whimsical 
appropriation of Artsakh imposed mistakenly by Stalin himself (Yunusof 2005, 28) through 
an incorrect placement of Karabakh Armenians under the Turkic-Muslim Azerbaijan SSR.    
In the meantime, Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry has been outlining what ethnic and 
military hostilities come emotionally to mean for both sides. Armenians consider the 1992-
94 war a succeed attempt to avoid the continuation of the 1915 “Armenocide” (Peachey 
1993, 35) perpetuated by Ottomans from Istanbul to the region of Anatolia. It followed that 
the worldwide Armenian community began to appreciate the resistance over Nagorno-
Karabakh – which tends to persist - because conducted on behalf of all Armenians. In few 
words, the struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh seems to interplay the role of Armenians’ 
Armenian-ness
2
. In the eyes of Armenians, the pogrom of Sumgait for sample, a soul-
destroying town of Azerbaijan, was a turning point, and history has generally been turning 
the Armenians’ spiritual and psychological wounds into a collective trauma (Grigorian 
1991, 52), bleeding and festering with self-pity and vengefulness. In early February 1988, 
Azerbaijani reaction to the early stages of the Karabakh Movement was to attack and 
murder Armenian minority’s civilians living in Azerbaijan SSR. Such cruel events have 
increased the Armenian fear of the Turkic-Muslim enemy and rekindled their memories to 
the Ottoman genocide that branded Armenian peoples’ collective consciousness in turn. 
The Armenian theologian Vigen Grigorian has highlighted that the burden of traumatic 
history rests nowadays on the memory of Armenians living the contemporary Caucasian 
homeland, in which de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is understood as part of it. 
According to Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the communitarian empathy for this grieving 
faith triggered by deportation from Ottoman millets and followed by Diaspora could serve 
to explain why Armenian memory runs deeper over last 170 years back the division of the 
Armenian Kingdom in 387 d.C. (Griffin 2002, 184). Due to all of these, Nagorno-Karabakh 
became the symbol of survival and revenge after the first mass-scale genocide during the 
                                                          
2According to the Armenian constitution, the Article 19 regards the term Armenian-ness that draws the national identity 
and its millenarian heritages with a comprehensive legal usage linked with the Diaspora. 
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First World War and the Soviet takeover, and this is why Armenians maintain their intent 
clear in reclaiming what they see and understand as part of their historical legacy. 
Similarly, the Armenian occupation of the Lachin corridor in May 15 1992 come to 
geographically mean not only a conjunction between the post-Communist territory of 
Armenia and the oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, but mostly a reunification for all Armenians 
who felt to psychologically be into a safety region surrounded and protected by Armenians. 
What has been representing a strong argument for allocating Nagorno-Karabakh to 
Azerbaijan SSR due to the lack of passable road between Armenia SSR and the Armenian 
enclave of Karabakh, since 1992 began to shape a new condition for securitizing a strategic 
mountain pass and interplay the national-building process of the former Soviet Armenia 
and redefine the national borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By contrary, 
Azerbaijanis feel to have been victims of theft due to the “Armenian aggression” within a 
region they consider their own storehouse nurturing their finest musicians and poets and 
composers of their national anthem (Goldenberg 1994, 156). As Sumgait for Armenians, 
the massacre of Khojali that broke out between 25th and 26th February 1992 was crucial 
for Azerbaijanis in the bigger pictures. 
By 1992, Azerbaijanis and Turkic-Meshkat minority’s members living the village of 
Khojaly were expelled by Armenian armed forces from their homes, killed and several 
froze overnight to death. The frighten experience has psychologically trenched a higher 
barrier against Armenians, guilty for such massacre and who demonstrated their readiness 
to fight a full-scale war (Kirvelyté 2015, 25) while young Azerbaijani state was in a worse 
military position because of the political crisis in Baku of 1991-93 that stood in the way of 
mobilization
3. The massacre of Khojaly could serve as historical proof to reveal Armenia’s 
inability to control over its militants (Goldenberg 1994, 156) and remember how the 
military takeover of the village is still the symbol of historical betrayal conducted by 
“loader Armenians” (Denisenko 2015, 60) with the support of the 366th motorized infantry 
regiment of the former Soviet Army troops. However, the Soviet regime neither supports 
Armenian armed forces nor Azerbaijan in the territorial riot. In fact, the events following 
the Sumgait pogrom have shown the Soviet inertia (Goldenberg 1994, 154) and, during the 
Soviet time, the Kremlin political establishment never supported the Armenian campaigns 
for the Karabakh reallot back to Armenian SSR. The entire was paradoxically shown by 
one of the first leaders of Karabakh Movement, Igor Muradyan, who leading Armenians to 
the square by bringing portrays of Gorbachev in order to catch public attention of the 
former leader of Soviet Union. “Lenin-Party-Gorbachev!” would be the slogan that he had 
come up with himself but, some weeks later, he came up with another one “Stalin-Beria-
Ligachev!” because no answers came from Moscow.    
In sum, Khojaly tragedy and Sumgait pogrom, as well as the significant capture of 
the town of Shoushi by Armenian forces on 9th May 1992, have significantly been crucial 
points for the definite resettlement of Nagorno-Karabakh to de facto Armenian authority as 
well as the symbol of terrible human losses and key element for claiming justice for 
Azerbaijan. This is why the idea that individuals responsible for the death of civilians must 
receive an appropriate punishment is currently expressed (Denisenko 2015, 68) in the 
official confrontation timeline between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Indeed, Khojaly 
                                                          
3However, the young Republic of Azerbaijan tried to take more active role than Armenia did in the ethnic turmoil all over 
the region of North Caucasus by projecting itself almost as a protector of some Turkic groups.    
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tragedy is commemorated, likewise the 1915 genocide for Armenians, not only in 
Azerbaijan at the “Mother’s Scream” memorial in Baku, but also abroad – Istanbul, The 
Hague, Berlin, Sarajevo and Mexico City. All psychological and cultural aspects over 
Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry are painlessly holding the idea of a “society of loss” (Fedoseeva 
2012, 399) since the uprising of the territorial conflict. Speaking historically, both 
communities involved in the conflict seem to highlight a new form of communicative 
mourning in deeply connection with a wealth of tumultuous, occupation, inquisitions, 
pogroms that have symbolically increased a more self-oriented collective faith and 
wrenching reality. Once again, symbols and images here connect a lot past experiences 
with an endless rivalry understood in terms of “perpetrators-against-victims”.   
The last “Four-Day War” in early April 2016, for instance, has quickly made 
stronger and stronger the social relationships among Armenians due to the beheading of 
Karam Sloyan in the Line of Contact (LoC). The image of the Karabakh Defense Army 
soldier’s head, uploaded in the social media and shown publicly off to Azerbaijani audience 
as a “fish-trophy”, has pointed anew out a memory of tragedy that Armenians connect with 
their own historical faith.    
All of these has shown to the international community how often threats can go 
forward to the sphere of human security over Nagorno-Karabakh. On one hand, for an 
event to interest the public opinion and the political mainstream must be something 
recognizable, it must affect people of whom we have heard spoken before (Gramsci 1912, 
2). On the other hand, this public kind of recognition seems wrongly to affect the OSCE-
Minsk operations and attempts for unfreezing the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. In being hidden and concealed, collective traumas perform as structuring 
principles for various public discourses, socio-cultural practices and rituals, as well as 
political causes for the willingness to embroider marks of trauma into the structure of 
everyday life. In turn, by including social bonds, what arises here is an imaginary idea of 
“society of loss” which portrays and addresses those traumatic narratives from within. The 
concept of collective trauma is widely used in modern social science in order to explain 
many events in the collective mind. The concepts of psychoanalysis, especially those 
concerning the concepts of trauma or post-traumatic disorder, such as the loss of Nagorno-
Karabakh for Azerbaijanis and vice versa the fear of losing the region for Armenians, are 
triggered by the impact of certain events connected to the feeling of pain (Ushakin 2009, 
23). By translating the psychoanalytical apparatus to a sociological one and in turn to 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue, each collective trauma seems to set a pathway for the historical 
narrative, while not becoming a part of it. The traumatic experience intertwines with 
national identity they mutually strengthen one another and these psychological aspects 
upon the warfare exacerbate the image of the Other and his race of enemy through which 
stereotypes and prejudices intensify a feeling of pain. Hence, the communication of tragic 
events creates a history-oriented narrative (Glavanakova 2016, 56) because Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis are “imagines”, i.e. they are held together by certain common features or 
imagines though the resources of both antagonist narrators, who provide “images” of the 
Other not by the past itself and not by the discipline of history. Rather, they give a public 
compilation of misleading images (Šutiniené 2011, 303) based on mythical and symbolic 
prejudices or stereotypes. For instance, according to the Yerevan sociologist Lyudmilla 
Harutyunian, who was one-time deputy in the Republic Supreme Soviet, points out that 
Armenians have forgotten the noble pages of their own history and they have created an 
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image of Armenians as victims, and it is a very deep image. During the twenty-five years, 
Armenian artists and writers have begun to address these problems (Guroian 1991, 52), and 
this is the main reason why most Armenian Church leaders have refused to recognize that 
the wrenching past brought the Armenian Christendom or secular legacy to an end.      
 
Table 2: Question asked on approval of women of their ethnicity marrying with Armenians or 
Azerbaijanis (Source: Caucasus Barometer, 2013). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the Table 2 shows upon (CRRC Barometer, 2013), when asked “do you approve 
of women of your ethnicity marrying with Azerbaijanis?” 96 % of Armenians responded 
disapproving such possibility, whereas in Azerbaijan the figure shows a 99% of people 
1 
99 
0 
Approve Disapprove NK/RA 
Caucasus Barometer 2013 Azerbaijan 
Retrived from http://caucasusbarometer.org  
MARWARM: Approval of women marrying Armenians (%) 
4 
96 
0 
Approve Disapprove NK/RA 
Caucasus Barometer 2013 Azerbaijan 
Retrived from http://caucasusbarometer.org  
MARWAZE: Approval of women marrying Azerbaijanis (%) 
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disapproving as well. The figure in 2015, not provided in Azerbaijan, was the same in 
Armenia (CRRC Barometer, 2015). In retrospect, the Table 3 below compares what 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis think is the most important issue their own country faces at the 
moment, within the answer regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, such as “unsolved 
territorial conflicts” and internal “lack of peace”, that matters only 3 %  and 2 %  for 
Armenians, whereas 38 %  for Azerbaijanis (CRRC Barometer, 2013). Despite higher % 
age than Armenian one, Azerbaijani result is paradoxically twofold: it is higher than 
unemployment and poverty issues, respectively 25 % and 8 % (CRRC Barometer, 2013), 
which are concerns in the so-called “cork” or “bottle” of the Caspian (Griffin 2001, 183), 
however it is not that high alike the previous result about human relationships.   
 
Table 3: Question asked to Armenians and Azerbaijanis about the most important issue facing their 
own country (Source: Caucasus Barometer 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
8 
5 
7 
7 
2 
38 
2 
6 
Unemployment 
Poverty 
Low Pensions 
Corruption 
Law Wages 
Inflation 
Unsolved Territorial Conflict 
Low quality of Education 
Other 
Caucasus Barometer Azerbaijan 2013 
Retrieved from http://caucasusbarometer.org 
IMPISS1: Most important issue facing the country (%) 
45 
16 
8 
5 
5 
4 
3 
2 
11 
1 
Unemployment 
Poverty 
Emigration 
Corruption 
Law Wages 
Inflation 
Unsolved Territorial Conflict 
Lack of Peace in the Country 
Other 
DK/RA 
Caucasus Barometer Armenia 2013 
Retrieved from http://caucasusbarometer.org 
IMPISS1: Most important issue facing the country (%) 
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In the political circles, the Nagorno-Karabakh issues seem to consolidate those 
Armenian and Azerbaijani ruling élites that manipulatively controlled them by using 
historical memory constructed to politically re-narrate the past and label what really 
happened to the new generations who use to attend public schools and watch public 
broadcasting where this narrative against the figure of the Other is present. Although only 
the 6,6% of all Azerbaijani, 7,1% of Armenian broadcastings and publications (Abasov 
2003, 592) are devoted to the conflict, public school curricula and mass media continuously 
exacerbate the tense relations, while the ruling elites use every opportunity to dehumanize 
the other side (Ayunts, Zolyan, and Zakaryan, 2016, 1) given back to the public 
consciousness. This explains the Armenian tendency to elect politicians belonging to the 
so-called “Karabakh Clan” (Kirvelyté 2015, 29) to the top political position. Following Ter 
Petrosyan, who had no personal ties with Nagorno-Karabakh, both last two Presidents of 
Armenia, Robert Kocharyan, who was previously president of de facto Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic (1994-1997) and Prime Minister of Armenia (1997-1998), as well as the current 
Armenian President Serzh Sarkisyan (2008-ongoing), who the second de facto head of 
Karabakh Armed Forces, come originally from the disputed region. On the other side, 
Azerbaijani scenario is not even positive. Whether the Armenia’s institutional landscape 
engages with public figures as well as national organizations and parties belonging to 
“Karabakh Clan”, the latter displays at least a political pluralism that, despite its low level, 
seems to be different from the neighbouring Azerbaijan the Alyev dynasty began to rule 
since 1993. Alike the Armenia’s political belongingness tied with Karabakh, the former 
President Hydar Aliev (1993-2003) and his son Ilham Aliev, currently ruling as President 
of the young Republic, belong to de jure exclave of Nackichevan, bounded by Armenia and 
Iran with a short-border with Turkey, which continues to suffer its geographic position and 
the conflict with Armenia.    
 
A FROZEN RELATIONSHIP 
 
Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was never a territorial dispute based on 
religious issues, Christian and Muslim belongingness of Armenians and Azerbaijanis could 
be a concern for future confrontation. Since the 1994 Bishkek Agreement, general attempts 
to unfreeze the tow-decades-conflict and many sustainable projects, such as Dreaming of a 
Colourful Garden
4
, attempted constantly to provide alternative spaces for contact among 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis by replacing the Line of Contact (LoC) which physically 
separates both sides. Main goals remain to seek peaceful transnational spaces in order to 
step forward in direction of Madrid Principles and OSCE-Minsk peacekeeping operations 
and guarantee the redeployment to all Erazy-Azerbaijani and Armenian internally displaced 
persons to their former places of residence inside Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, the 
inevitable “Other question” will definitely come to perform a structural role for those 
generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis who are slowly replacing the oldest ones. Their 
social imaginary offers negatively a counter-subjective representation of the Other through 
a product of the binary “Us-and-Them” opposition, which is a social construct, used in turn 
                                                          
4The title of the project aims to overturn the classical idea of the region negatively accounted into a “dark zone” due to the 
ethnic conflict and the meaning of the prefix-Nagorno, which derives from Russian attributive adjective “nagorny”, 
literally “highland”, and the suffix-Karabakh, a Persian word for indicating a “Black Garden”.   
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to throw light on the conception of the Other in aloof way. Here, the negative mirror image 
of the Other seems to be clearly privileged because often expressed in terms of monstrous 
and alien Other (Glavanakova 2016, 45). “We’re the victims, you’re the perpetrators” could 
briefly serve as short quote upon the common notion of the Other originating from both 
sides, edited publicly out as well as partly glorified. Therefore, common empathy and 
sensitivity of Otherness seem thus to be internalized. Armenians bring alive for the further 
generations their historical plight portraying not simply as an object of distress, but through 
the subjects of its articulation and expression, not merely as victim but as agents, actors, 
and authors (Marjian 2016, 104). As the Armenian political scientist Levon Melik-
Shakhnazarian speculated on the fortune of the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-94, “in this 
case civilisation will win” (Goldenberg 1994, 154) because the Armenian past turned 
finally into a winning stage. Likewise, brainwashing and overwhelming political 
propaganda links Azerbaijani understanding with all psychological forms of war of ideas 
against the Other-Armenians, where the main weapons are image and sound, which 
organize successfully a process of negative persuasion (Martišius 2010, 195) over the 
territorial rivalry. All of these may affect the confrontation with the Other cementing 
negatively the creation of a wealthier community due to a demonization of the Other 
(Lorusso 2016, 5) fraught with bloody imaginary. Hence, shall Armenians and Azerbaijanis 
deal with historical memories and wrenching experiences, or will they crush once again 
when they will be living together? How do they image their everyday life after the 
definitive peace agreement? What is to be forgotten from the past and what is to be 
recorded in order to avoid future threats? Nowadays, the figure of the Other - no matter if 
Armenian or Azerbaijani – is permanently present in the social imaginary. Constructed by 
the Self in a variety of way, this perception of the Other arises a complex interaction 
between self-identification and definition provided by Others of oneself. On one side, 
internal and external impact of Otherness is simultaneously familiar and strange to 
everyone, however, according to Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry, it could hopefully affirm that 
when perspectives will be changing such holistic imaginary of the Other (Boesh 2007, 5) 
will change accordingly. Due to dynamism, relativity, continually fluctuating and 
ceaselessly reversibility of the role and figure of the Other under certain historical 
circumstances and cultural and socio-political extents, it may be possible to ensure the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the risky 5 %  of territorial conflict assumed as unsolvable 
(Ayunts, Zolyan, and Zakaryan 2016, 4). Since individuals differ in their personal 
experiences of intercultural exchanges and contacts, they also differ in what cultural 
element they choose to adopt and internalize. However, most recent pivotal studies have 
proven that the territorial rivalry between Armenian and Azerbaijani youths of Moscow, as 
well as the role of their different ethnic identities and cultures, does not affect negatively 
their human relationships. Interviews and discussions held in 2006-07 have pointed out that 
the existing tendencies of Armenians and Azerbaijani mourning and its social influence 
driven by collective trauma are much lower than in those groups of Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis living the Caucasian young republics. According to the survey conducted in 
Russia, ethnic identity seems to be not a concern because not eternally influenced and 
emotionally loaded in political rhetoric and propagandistic arguments about the atrocities of 
the Other (Savin, 2015) and the reference about their ethnicity seems to have not an 
important quality beside the brainwashing emotions by political power.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Although the Nagorno-Karabakh rivalry is academically tagged as frozen conflict, 
such definition does not catch the real state of affair within the current lack of definitive 
solutions and political wills. Yet, this “no-war-no-peace” limbo challenges the sphere of 
human security for those locals living alongside the Line of Contact (LoC) on both sides, as 
well as the future of both Caucasian young republics in terms of political and economic 
development.   
The question about the Other seems definitely to represent a challenging conflict 
(trans-)formation paradigm from the classical approaches upon conflict resolution 
mechanisms. According to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the role of Other may serve as a 
conﬂict transformation approaches to the future peace agreement among embittered 
adversaries. Definitely, future prospects for conflict transformation should focus more at 
the future human relationships, which may theoretically transform the sense of Armenian-
Azerbaijani Self alongside the examination of the conditioned and motivated biases of the 
Self towards the Other. Over Nagorno-Karabakh, future forms of involvement with the 
Other will be not reducible to simply binary opposition “us-against-them”, nowadays in the 
political and social mainstream manifested in traumatic acts of self-identification against 
the Other, but as a new relation between self-ness and Otherness based on intricate 
constellation of interconnectedness (Glavanakova 2016, 19).   
The mirror of wrenching situations shattered and battered by two-decades-war, in 
which it might find such answers from history and it might find also find again our 
humanity through reconciliation, hence repentance, forgiveness, healing and renewal, that 
in the first instance nation-building may be at the heart of the communitarian vocation of 
Nagorno-Karabakh in the future.     
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